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Article 5

Title VII & The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
What Professional Firms Should Know
[W]hateuer affects the condition of women, their habits and their
opinions, has great political importance in my eyes. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The employment practices of professional firms may be on
a collision course with the law. Section 107 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 declares that an unlawful employment practice is
established "when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice."2 Although innocuous at first
blush, this passage essentially abolishes3 an employer's "mixed
motive" defense4 and increases the likelihood that more professional firms will be sued for discriminatory hiring and promotion decisions.
Interestingly, this change occurs at a time when the legal
profession is projected to experience little or n·o growth during
the 1990s. 5 Making the situation more complex is that since
1986, sixty-two percent of entering first year law students are
either female or minority students. 6 Thousands of minority
and female associates who graduated from law schools in the
mid-1980s are currently being or soon will be considered for
partnership-an institution long dominated by white males. 7

1.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Vol. II, 209 (H. Reeve
trans., 1945).
2.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 107fi
(adding subsection (m) to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)) (emphasis added).
3.
If an employer demonstrates that it would have made the same decision
absent the impermissible discrimination, it will still be liable. However, such evidence may limit the plaintiffs award. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 107(b), 105 Stat. at 1075.
4.
See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
5.
Steven Brill, The Law Business in the Year 2000, AM. LAWYER, June 1989,
at 6.
6.
Hattie-Jo P. Mullins, Women and the Law: Will Real Life Catch Up to
T.V.?, Ms., June 1987 at 64, quoting 1986 U.S. Labor Department statistics.
7.
According to a 1988 survey "more than 90 percent of the partners in the
nation's largest law firms are white males." Doreen Weisenhaus, Still a Long Way
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This article is not intended to critique the law, but rather
to provide an overview of recent caselaw regarding discrimination in the partnership selection process. It also suggests policies and procedures professional firms should implement to
limit Title VII liability.
II. TITLE VII AND THE GENESIS OF DISCRIMINATORY
SUITS AGAINST PROFESSIONAL FIRMS

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in
1972, declares:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 8

On more than one occasion, the United States Supreme
Court has emphasized that the "central statutory purposes" of
Title VII are "eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination."9 Despite these lofty goals, for nearly
twenty years employment law under Title VII dealt almost
exclusively "with the problems of providing equal opportunity
for employees who work with their hands rather than with
people, paper or ideas." 10 As a result, many professional firms
assumed Title VII did not apply to their decisions about whom
to make a partner.
to C'TO for Women, Minorities, NAT'L L.J., Feb. R, 1988, at 1, 48-58.
Only 25 years ago, women were recognized as second class citizens in the legal
profession: "Women, no matter what their ethnic or racial affiliations, usually have
greater difficulty than men in establishing themselves as lawyers. Clients tend to
shun them, and employers, if they will hire any women for lawyer positions usually keep them in less responsible and less important jobs." QUINTINE JOHNSTONE &
DAN HC>PSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 19 (1967).
8.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (19R8).
9.
Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (197fi); see also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264-6fi (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
For a brief discussion of the legislative history of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, see Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed Motive
Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, R2 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982).
10.
Andrea R. Waintroob, The Developin,; Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White r:ollar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 4fi, 46
(1979).
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However, the 1984 Supreme Court decision Hishon v. King
& Spalding 11 made clear that Title VII applied to partnership

admission decisions and that the opportunity to be considered
for partnership is a "privilege of employment." 12 Despite earlier indications that a law firm's partnership decisions fell under
the aegis of Title VII, 13 Hishon sent shockwaves throughout
the legal community. 14
A.

Hishon v. King & Spalding 15

1.

Facts

Elizabeth Hishon was a seven-year associate with the large
Atlanta law firm of King & Spalding, a general partnership
under Georgia law. In 1980, King & Spalding had fifty partners
and employed fifty associate attorneys. No woman had ever
been a partner. 16 As was customary at the end of an
associate's sixth year, King & Spalding considered whether to
admit Hishon to the partnership in May 1978. The firm rejected Hishon's application. One year later, the firm again refused
to admit Hishon to the partnership. 17 Consistent with the
firm's "up or out" policy, Hishon was notified to begin seeking
employment elsewhere. 18
Hishon subsequently filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that King &
11.
467 U.S. 69 (1984).
12.
!d. at 77.
13.
Before the Supreme Court decided Hishon, at least 3 federal district courts
specifically addressed Title VII's application to the legal profession. Lucido v.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that an associate attorney's allegation of firm's discrimination and unlawful termination and
refusal to make him a partner are actionable under Title VII); EEOC v. Rinella &
Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir.
1974) (holding that the professional nature of defendant law firm does not exempt
it from Title VII suit by associate attorneys); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, fi9
F.R.D. fi15 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
that female student not hired by large law firm may bring class action suit under
Title VII for discriminatory hiring practices on behalf of all similarly situated women).
14.
Rowland L. Young, Law Firm Partnership Decisions Subject to Title VII, 70
A.B.A. J. 108 (1984); W. Connolly, Admtsswn to Partnership Subject to Title VII,
N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1984, at 1, col. 1.; Arthur J. Marziale, Jr., Note, Hishon v. Kinf?
& Spaldinf.?: Implications for the Private Partnership, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 1fi1
(1984).
15.
467 u.s. 69 (1984).
16.
!d. at 71.
17.
!d. at 72.
18.
678 F.2d at 1024.
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Spalding had violated Title VII by discriminating against her
on the basis of sex. Hishon alleged that the firm promised
promotion to partnership as "a matter of course" for associates
who received satisfactory evaluations as a recruiting device. 19
Hishon claimed that these promises were a key factor in her
decision to join King & Spalding. 20 Hishon sought backpay
and compensatory damages if her claim for reinstatement and
elevation to partnership failed. 21

2. Procedural History
The federal district court dismissed Hishon's complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that Title VII did
not apply to partnership selection decisions. 22 The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 23 and the United
States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Burger. 24

3.

Court's analysis

As an initial matter, the Supreme Court ruled that "[o]nce
a contractual relationship is established, the provisions of Title
VII attach."25 The Court held that consideration for partnership may properly be a "term, condition, or privilege of employment" if "the evidence at trial establishes that the parties contracted to have [Hishon] considered for partnership."26 Since a
contract for employment may be either express or implied, the
contractual relationship between Hishon and King & Spalding
did not preclude liability under Title Vll. 27
The Supreme Court also ruled that an aggrieved employee
does not necessarily have to prove that the alleged "term, condition, or privilege of employment" is specifically contained in
the contract itself. An employer may provide its employees with
so many "benefits" that the benefit comes to be viewed as a

19.
467 U.S. at 71-72.
Id.
20.
21.
Id.
22.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 81,70:{, at
20,062, 20,064 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
28.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 459 U.S. 1169 (1983).
24.
467 U.S. at 69.
25.
Id. at 74.
26.
ld. at 75.
Id.
27.
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privilege: "[a] benefit that is part and parcel of the employment
relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion,
even if the employer would be free under the employment contract not to provide the benefit at all." 28
In short, the Court ruled that regardless of whether or not
a formal employment contract exists, an employee may make
out a Title VII claim if the alleged discrimination involved a
"benefit" of employment which had come to be viewed as an
essential part of the employment relationship. In demonstrating that consideration for partnership was "part and parcel" of
the employment relationship, the Supreme Court emphasized
that King & Spalding's associates "regularly expected to be
considered for partnership"; that "lawyers outside the firm
were not routinely considered" for partnership; and that King
& Spalding "explicitly used the prospect of ultimate partnership to induce young lawyers to join the firm." 29 Significantly,
the Court made clear that the firm's "up or out" policy demonstrated that the opportunity for partnership was an essential
part of employment at King & Spalding: associates are "terminated if they are not elected to become partners."30
As part of its analysis, the Court evaluated King &
Spalding's main argumene 1 that elevation to partnership is a
change in status from an "employee" to "employer" and that an
offer to become an "employer" is not itself an offer of employment. The Court responded that:
The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to
fall within Title VII's protection; it need only be a term, condition or privilege of employment .... Accordingly, nothing in
the change of status that advancement to partnership might

28.

29.
30.

ld.
Id. at 76.
Id.

31.
The Court rejected, with very little elaboration, King & Spalding's ancillary
argument that partnerships are exempt from Title VII scrutiny. The Court reasoned that "nothing in the statute or legislative history . . . support[s] such a per
se exemption. When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it
expressly did so." 467 U.S. at 77.
Similarly, the Court rejected King & Spalding's argument that imposing liability for partnership selection decisions infringes on the constitutional rights of expression or association. The Court cited Norwood u. Harrison, 413 U.S. 4fifi, 470
(1973), for the proposition that "[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but is has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections." 467
U.S. at 78.
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entail means that partnership consideration falls outside the
terms of the statute32

4. Powell's Concurrence
Despite the self-proclaimed narrowness of the Court's holding,33 Justice Powell, former president of the American Bar
Association, wrote to "make clear ... that the Court's opinion
should not be read as extending Title VII to the management of
a law firm by its partners."34 Justice Powell also pointed out
that the relationship among law partners and the dynamics of
intra-partnership decision-making differ fundamentally from
the traditional employer-employee relationship. 35 Law firms
may not unlawfully discriminate during the admissions process, but law firms should be able to make 'judgmental and
sensitive decisions" which "embrace a wide range of subjects."36

B.

What Hishon Means

The impact of Hishon is twofold. First, Title VII protections
apply to partnership admission decisions. Second, plaintiffs can
pursue sex discrimination claims against professional partnerships.
III. HARBINGER OF REFORM:
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 37
Since Hishon, no Supreme Court ruling has specifically
addressed the denial of partnership status in a private law
firm. 38 Although Hishon means that sex discrimination claims
against law firms are legally tenable under Title VII, Hishon
32.
ld. at 77.
33.
See id. at 77-7R n.10, where C.J. Burger emphasizes the Court's "narrow
holding."
ld. at 79.
34.
35.
ld. at 79-81.
ld. Powell listed such "subjects", including "profits and other types of com36.
pensation; work assignments, approval of commitments in bar association, civic, or
political activities; questions of billing; acceptance of new clients; questions of conflicts of interest; retirement programs; and expansion policies." Id. at 79-80 n.3.
:37.
490 U.S. 228 (19R9).
3R.
However, at least nne lower court opinion since Hishon has considered a
large Philadelphia law firm's sexual discriminatory practices. Ezold v. Wolf, Block,
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 7!\1 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see infra text accompanying notes 115-21.
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did not provide any specific guidance about the type of sex discrimination that could support a successful Title VII claim. The
next Supreme Court decision that grappled with sex discrimination in a professional firm's partnership selection process
was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 39 a "mixed motive" case,40
which served as a catalyst for major Congressional reform of
Title VII. 41
A.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

1. Facts
Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at Price Waterhouse's
Office of Govemment Services in Washington D.C., was proposed as a candidate for partnership in 1982, after working five
years with the firm. Of the eighty-eight persons considered for
partnership that year, Hopkins was the only woman. 42 Fortyseven candidates were admitted as partners; twenty-one were
rejected; and twenty, including Hopkins, were "held for reconsideration" the following yearY Thirty-two Price Waterhouse
partners evaluated Hopkins' candidacy. Thirteen favored admission, eight voted against partnership, eight did not know
her well enough to form an opinion, and three recommended
that her candidacy be placed on hold. 44
Hopkins' positive evaluations stressed her "deft touch,"
"strong character, independence and integrity" and characterized her as "an outstanding professional." One evaluator commented that she was "extremely competent [and] intelligent"
and another that she was "strong and forthright, very productive, energetic, and creative."45
Virtually all the partners' negative comments focused on
Hopkins' interpersonal skills, including the perception that she
was sometimes "overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to
work with, and impatient with the staff."46 One partner de-

39.
40.
factors
faclors
Mount
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
"Mixed motive" cases arise when an employer considers both illegitimate
(such as an individuals race, sex, religion, or national origin) and legitimate
(such as incompetence, misconduct, or poor qualifications or experience).
Healthy Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-Rfi (1977).
See infra text accompanying notes 69-78.
490 U.S. at 233.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 234.
ld. at 234-3fi.
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scribed her as "macho" and another opined that she "overcompensated for being a woman." A third evaluator recommended
"a course at charm school," while another partner advised that
her chances for partnership would be improved the next year if
Hopkins would "walk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."47
Before Hopkins' candidacy could be re-evaluated the next
year, Price Waterhouse advised Hopkins that she would not be
reconsidered for partnership. 48 Hopkins resigned and brought
a Title VII claim against Price Waterhouse.

2. Procedural History
The district court found that Price Waterhouse had refused
to promote Hopkins for both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.49 The district court held Price Waterhouse liable, but declined to order backpay and re-instatement. 50 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district
court's decision on liability, but reversed on relief. 51 The Supreme Court reversed in a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 52

3.

Court's Analysis and Holding

a. Brennan's Plurality. The Court found no error in the
district court's factual finding that Price Waterhouse used sex
stereotyping in declining to promote Hopkins to partnership.
The plurality held that
[O]nce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played
a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
may avoid ... liability only by proving that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to
play such a role. 53

47.
!d. at 28!'i.
48.
!d. at 28:3 n.l.
49.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114-20 (D.D.C. 1985).
The legitimate reasons included her harsh treatment of staff and the perceived
defects in her interpersonal skills. The illegitimate reasons were partners' comments based on gender stereotypes.
50.
!d. at 1122.
51.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 82!'i F.2d 4fi8, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
52.
490 U.S. at 258.
58.
!d. at 244-45.
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In addition, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
because it had incorrectly applied the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard to Price Waterhouse's claim that it would
have made the same decision without the discriminatory evaluations. 54 Rather, the correct standard was "preponderance of
the evidence,"55 the conventional standard employed in civil
litigation under Title VII. 56 The plurality also suggested the
employer could satisfy this evidentiary burden with "objective
evidence."57
In short, the plurality held that if an employer refuses to
hire or promote an employee based on both illegitimate, discriminatory motives and legitimate, nondiscriminatory motives,
the employer will not be liable if it can demonstrate by a "preponderance of the evidence" that it would have made the same
decision absent the discriminatory motive. 58

b. Concurring Opinions. Justice White agreed that the
proper standard is preponderance of the evidence, but took exception to the plurality's requirement that the employer submit
objective evidence. 59 Rather, White suggested that an
employer's own credible testimony would suffice. 60
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion concurring in
the judgment, but disagreed with the plurality's conclusions
about the substantive requirement of causation under the statute. 51

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

Id.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 254-55.
at 253.
at 252.
at 244-45.
at 260.

at 261. The plurality commented that this suggestion was "baffling." ld.

at 252 n.l4.

61.
ld. at 261. For an excellent discussion of the different standards of causation espoused in Price Waterhouse, see Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495
(1990).
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c. Dissenting Opinion. Justice Kennedy, along with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissented, questioning the plurality's causation standard and burden of proof
formulation. 62

4. Further Proceedings on Remand
On remand to the district court, Judge Gesell offered both
parties the opportunity to introduce new evidence on the issue
of liability. 63 Both sides chose to have the district court determine liability based on the evidence already presented. 64 Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, Judge
Gesell ruled that he was not persuaded that Price Waterhouse
would have rejected Hopkins' candidacy for partnership had
Hopkins not been a woman. 65 Judge Gesell ordered Price Waterhouse to elevate Hopkins to partnership status and award
backpay and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 66

B.

Response to Price Waterhouse

Price Waterhouse generated calls from legal commentators,
civil rights advocates, the plaintiffs bar, 67 and politicians who
sought "congressional action" to reverse the effects of the Supreme Court's perceived indifference to civil rights. 68

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

490 U.S. at 280-81.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (D.D.C. 1990).
!d. at 1204.
!d. at 1206-07.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Price Waterhouse will expand the zone of caution [for the plaintiffs bar in
taking Title VII cases] and, correspondingly, expand the areas in
which unconscious attitudes or even conscious prejudice operate.
The plaintiffs counsel will have to determine not only whether
there is evidence of discrimination but also whether the plaintiffs
record is such that the employer might prevail because of the
"same decision principle" . . . . [Plaintiffs] counsel will become more
cautious, and only those plaintiffs who have both evidence of discrimination and a good work record are likely to find representation.

Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price Waterhouse and the Indiuidual
Employment Discrimination Case, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 10110 (1990).
68.
See wnerally William B. (}(mld, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment
Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and ConJ?ressional Response, 64 TlJL.
L. REV. 14811 (1990). Another commentator wrote "[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions
[including Price Waterhouse] ... signal the perception of some Justices that the
harshest forms of discrimination have been substantially eliminated and that the
doctrines should now be reshaped to allow employers more leeway." Blumrosen, su-
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Congressional Response

In late 1989, Congressman Augustus F. Hawkins (D-Cal.)
introduced House Bill 4000 69 and Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) introduced a similar bill in the Senate 70 to create
the "Omnibus Civil Rights Act of 1990." The bill's stated purpose was to overturn five Supreme Court decisions 71-all from
the Court's 1989 term-which were seen by the bill's proponents as weakening important employment discrimination
protections under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 72 The
bill was also meant to increase the remedies available to victims of employment discrimination and harassment. 73

2.

Opposition and Conciliation

Private employers and the Bush administration vigorously
opposed the bill. 74 President Bush vetoed what he had previously branded a "quota bill." 75 However, congressional support
for a civil rights bill did not subside. Under political pressure,76 President Bush lent support for a compromise bill engi-

pra note 67, at 1061.
Ironically, Justice Brennan, whose Price Waterhouse opinion became a lightning
rod of criticism, wrote, during the 19R9 term, that Congress' assertiveness in overruling Supreme Court decisions demonstrates its willingness "to overturn this
Court's mistaken interpretations of Civil Rights Statutes." Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 200-01 n.9 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
For an interesting overview of Congressional attempts to overrule various Supreme Court civil rights decisions from the mid-1980s, see Abner J. Mikva & Jeff
Bleich, When Conwess Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729, 740-48 (1991).
69.
H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). A similar bill was also introduced
by Congressman Campbell (D-Cal.). H.R. 341i5, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (19R9).
70.
S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
71.
ld. The five Supreme Court decisions included Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989);
Wards Cove Packing Cove v. Atonion, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 71ili (19R9); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
DAVID A. CATHCART & MARK SNYDEZMAN, American Law Institute & Ameri72.
can Bar Association, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 13 (1992).
73.
ld.
74.
Employers were troubled that the bill went beyond "restoring prior federal
civil rights laws and proposed a new remedial scheme including jury trials, possible compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination claims under
Title VII, and changes in the 'business necessity' defense frequently invoked in
disparate impact cases." ld.
71i.
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: LAW AND EXPLANATION 3-4 (1991).
76.
By October 1991 President Bush reportedly began softening his position and
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neered by Senator John Danforth (R-Mo.) and Senator Kennedy. With the President's approbation, the bill passed easily
through Congress. 77 On November 21, 1991, President Bush
signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 78
IV.

CONGRESS REVERSES THE SUPREME COURT

A pertinent provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is
Section 107: "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."79
This provision, as intended, abrogates Price Waterhouse's
essential holding. No longer will an employer escape liability if
it can prove that it would have made the same decision absent
discriminatory motives. 80 However, the "same decision" doctrine remains relevant in the remedial phase of the mixedmotive litigation. If the employer successfully argues that it
would have made the same decision without discrimination, the
employer will not be required to reinstate the plaintiff, grant
backpay or pay compensatory or punitive damages. However,
courts may still order declaratory and injunctive relief and

backing away from the "quota bill" label. One legal periodical reported that
[a] heightened public awareness of sexual harassment evolving from the
confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, and
the rise of David Duke, the former Ku Klux Klan leader who became a
Republican gubernatorial candidate in Louisiana, are two factors thought
to have caused Bush's sudden shift on civil rights legislation.
Julia C. Ross, New Civil RiRhts Act, 7R A.B.A. J. Rfi (1992).
77.
The Senate passed the bill 73-22. 137 CoNO. REC. 815,967-6!'! (daily ed.
Nov. 5, 1991); 'l.'he vote in the House of Representatives was 3R1-3R. 137 CoN<:.
REC. H9557-58 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).
78.
Ross, supra note 76, at 85.
79.
42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1992).
80.
This new rule for mixed motive cases makes Title VII litigation unique
from other areas of employment law. For example, an employer can avoid liability
under the National Labor Relations Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1fi1-169 (1988), by
showing that an employee who alleges that he was discharged in part because of
his union membership or activities would have been discharged for another, legitimate reason. NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. ;~98 (1988).
Similarly, for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), an employer can escape
liability for allegedly violating an employee's First Amendment free speech rights,
if the employer can show that it would have reached the same decision absent the
illegitimate motivation. Mount Healthy Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977).

99]

TITLE VII & THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

111

award attorney's fees and costs, even if the employer makes a
"same decision" showing. 81

A. Limits on Liability
One of the central compromises82 of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act is the provision that limits possible awards in job discrimination suits according to the size of the defendant employer:
$50,000 for employers with 15-100 employees; $100,000 for
employers with 101-200 employees; $200,000 for employers
with 201-500 employees; and $300,000 for those with more
than 500 employees. 83 These liability award caps 84 apply in
cases involving discrimination based on sex, religion, and disability, but not to racial minorities. Victims of racial discrimination may receive unlimited compensatory and punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 85
Firms with fourteen or fewer employees are exempt from
Title VII liability. 86 The number of employees is based on the
number of persons employed by an employer in each of twenty
weeks during the current or preceding calendar year. 87 Presumably, the twenty weeks do not need to be consecutive. Under Hishon, associates who expect to be considered for partnership as part of their employment contract are "employees."88
However, it is unclear whether partners are considered "employees."89 Since sixty percent of the nation's attorneys prac-

Ill.
CATHCART & SNYDEZMAN, supra note 72, at 14.
H2.
!d. at 25.
H3.
Section 102, Civil Rights Act of 1991, now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 19H1a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
84.
These liability caps apply to "each complaining party." !d. "Complaining
party" is defmed as "the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Attorney
General, or a person who may bring a cause of action or proceeding" under Title
VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981-a(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1992). As explained by legal commentators
The EEOC, as part of its enforcement efforts, often brings suit on behalf
of several complainants in the same action. A literal reading of the Act
indicates that the EEOC would be limited in such suits to the single
statutory cap on damages, regardless of how many persons it was representing. Courts can expect the EEOC to oppose this plain language reading as contrary to congressional purpose.
CATHCART & SNYDEZMAN, supra note 72, at 25.
85.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
86.
42 U.S.C.A. § 19Rl-a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
87.
!d.
H8.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
89.
See Susan Wubbenhorst, Note, Law Partnership Decisions: Title VII Ap-
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tice in firms with fewer than 5 partners, 90 (and presumably
have fewer than fifteen total support personnel) the majority of
firms in the U.S. are probably exempt from Title VII liability.
However, since the law is ambiguous in this area, prudent
firms with fifteen or more employees (including partners)
should obviously comply with Title VII.

B.

Impact on Employers and Employees

1. A Plaintiffs Boon?
Just as legal commentators and analysts predicted that
Price Waterhouse would stymie discrimination suits, 91 Section
107's enactment has generated antithetical projections: "Perhaps more than any other section of the Act, Section 107 has
the greatest potential for increasing Title VII litigation. The
most fertile ground for such suits are hiring and promotion
decisions for executive and professional employment."92
This prediction may be apt for a number of reasons. First,
executive and professional decisions involve both objective and
subjective components. The selection of intimate business associates,93 for whom one may be personally liable, necessarily
requires the subjective evaluation of such traits as competence,
skills, personal interests, integrity, personality, motivation, and

plies-Will It Make A Difference?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 46R, 47R-79 (19Rfi).
90.
The Legal Profession Survey: The Rule of Lawyers, THE EcoNOMIS'T, July lH,
1992, at supp. 5.
91.
See Blumrosen, supra note 67.
92.
CATHCART & SNYDEZMAN, supra note 72, at 29.
93.
Interestingly, the trial court in Hishon compared partnership selection decisions to marriage:
In a very real sense a professional partnership is like a marriage. It is,
in fact, nothing less than a "business marriage" for better or worse. Just
as in marriage different brides bring different qualities into the union-some beauty, some money, and some character-so also in a professional partnerships, new mates or partners are Rought and betrothed for
different reasons and to serve different needs of the partnership. Some
new partners bring legal skills, others bring clients. Still others bring
personality and negotiating skills. In both, new mates are expected to
bring not only ability and industry, but also moral character, fidelity,
trustworthiness, loyalty, personality, and love. Unfortunately, in partnerships, as in matrimony, these needed, worthy and desirable qualities are
not necessarily divided evenly among the applicants according to race,
age, sex or religion, and in some they just are not present at all. To use
or apply Title VII to coerce a mismatched or unwanted partnership too
closely resembles a statute for the enforcement of shotgun weddings.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, supra note 22, at 20,062.
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the ability to work with others. Even Hishon recognized that
partnership decisions raise concerns about privacy and freedom
of association. 94
Second, these types of professional decisions frequently
include observations and evaluations by supervisors and fellow
employees. As Price Waterhouse illustrates, individuals frequently express opinions in stereotypical terms. 95 Since these
potentially tainted individual views are incorporated into the
firm or business' larger decision making process, Section 107's
"motivating factor" formula has potentially profound consequences for professional partnership decisions.
Third, because of Section 107, upset or disappointed employees have increased incentive to examine business records,
evaluations, and forms seeking to uncover any impermissible
reference to them that might have improperly affected the
selection process. Formerly, an employer could escape liability
if impermissible criteria were present or even considered; the
employer merely needed to show that the forbidden consideration was not a determining factor. 96 Now, plaintiffs and civil
rights plaintiffs attorneys (many of whom are retained on a
contingency fee) 97 will have the incentive to proceed with Title
VII suits, since the existence of even one impermissible consideration may subject the employer to a minimum of attorney's
fees and costs. Liberal discovery rules 98 as well as the
plaintiffs relatively light burden of going forward 99 seem certain to encourage Title VII litigation.

94.
467 U.S. at 7R. See generally Note, Applicability of Federal
Antidiscrimination Lef?islation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L. REV.
2R2 (1977). This pre-Hishon note discusses the inherent tensions between a law
firm's desire to decide when and with whom it chooses to do business and society's
general desire to eliminate discrimination in the workplace.
9/i.
490 U.S. at 232-37; see supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
96.
See supra text accompanying note li3.
97.
See Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 1050.
9R.
FED. R. C!V. P. 26(b), which applies to all forms of discovery, provides generally that the parties may "obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... "
99.
Section 107 retains the Price Waterhouse balancing paradigm. Consequently,
after a plaintiff makes out a showing that an illegal consideration may have motivated the defendant's decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to
show that legitimate business considerations would have justified the decision. The
presence of discriminatory memoranda, evaluations or decision-making documents
will probably fulfill the plaintiffs initial burden.
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2. Employer's Defenses
Perhaps the most immediate and obvious effect section 107
will have on employers' defenses and litigation strategies is
that employers will redouble efforts to prevail on the "no discrimination" defense. Under Price Waterhouse, defendants, in
effect, were given a second chance to avoid liability by invoking
the "same decision" defense, even though enough evidence
existed to demonstrate that a discriminatory motive existed. 100 As a result, defendants had less incentive to settle before trial. However, since Section 107 abolishes the "same decision" defense, defendants will probably be more .unenable to
pre-trial settlement offers and the nuisance value of employee
suits will increase.
In addition, employers will argue that Section 107's "a
motivating factor" language says nothing about the weight to
be placed on the illegitimate employment consideration. On one
hand, Section 107 might be read to mean that the presence of a
discriminatory motive gives rise to an inference that an illegitimate factor influenced the decision. Conversely, defendants
might argue that the word "motivating," which modifies "factor," presupposes that the alleged discriminatory consideration
was more than an incidental part of the challenged decisionmaking process. For support, defendants might emphasize that
five Justices in Price Waterhouse suggested, in varying contexts, that an illegitimate motive should be a "substantial factor" in the decision. 101 If courts embrace these arguments, the
plaintiff must demonstrate more than the mere fact that discrimination might have entered into the employer's decision
making process.

100.
See 490 U.S. at 246 (wherein Justice Brennan writes "the employer's burden [of persuasion] is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense" (emphasis
added).
101.
In dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote:
I read the opinions as establishing that in a limited number of cases
Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant
to show that an adverse employment dedsion would have been supported
by legitimate reasons. The shift in the burden of persuasion occurs only
where a plaintiff proves by direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a
substantial factor actually relied upon in making the decision.
490 U.S. 22H, 2RO (19H9) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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In any event, if Section 107 provides defendants with any
wiggle room, it will probably be found in the still less-thanclear "motivating factor" language. Considering the relative
newness of mixed motive litigation under Title VII, employers-especially professional firms and partnerships-will do
well to improve the partnership decision making process.
V.

PARTNERSHIP CRITERIA IN PROFESSIONAL
FIRMS AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS

Obviously, Section 107 and its probable effects should
encourage professional firms to select partners with greater
caution and formality. In addition, it is important to point out
that employers still retain considerable discretion in evaluating
partnership applications and may rely on objective and subjective criteria. Although these criteria are discussed below in the
context of partnership selection in law firms, this article's caveats and suggestions apply to all professional firms.
A.

Objective Factors

Objective factors are rarely attacked as discriminatory
since most involve empirical criteria and, in theory, apply to all
partnership candidates equally. Listed below are four objective
factors that typically weigh heavily in a partnership's admission decision. 10:l

1.

"Put-In Time"

So that partners can make an informed, well-reasoned
evaluation of the associate attorney's abilities, law firms should
require that the associate be part of the firm for at least a
minimum period. Although five years used to be considered the
norm, 103 more firms-especially in larger metropolitan areas
and with complex practices-are lengthening the minimum
period to as long as ten years. 104 Each firm should have a
"put-in time" policy if for no other reason than to prevent the
appearance of favoritism and caprice in its decision making.

102.
See William F. Lynch II, How Law Firms Select Partners, 70 A.B.A. J. 6fi
(19R4); sPe also Deborah Grahm, Gaston Snow Charts New Waters with Flexible
Two-Tier Approach, OF COUNSEL, April 6, 19R7, at 4-10, explaining a large Boston
firm's partnerRhip selection criteria.
1m.
Lynch, supra note 102, at 6fi.
104.
Brill, supra note fi, at 6.
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2. Economic value to the firm
An associate must be profitable. Usually this means that
an associate must have a high number of billable hours, 105
which generate revenue for the firm. A rule of thumb used by
some firms is that associates must generate three times their
salary to be "profitable." 106

3. Rainmaking skills
Associates must be able to generate business or have the
potential to develop business for the firm. 107 A lawyer who
does not "kill more than he eats" will probably not be considered seriously for partnership. 108 Few firms can afford partners who do not keep themselves busy and create work for
other attorneys, paralegals or legal assistants.

4.

Caseload and complexity

An associate must be an effective case manager and demonstrate the ability to handle cases that are large and complex

105.
Increasingly, law firms are focusing less on billable hours and more on
"collectibles." "Collectibles" are fees which the law firm realizes from an attorney's
billings. Obviously, this "bottom line" approach emphasizes what the associate's
work means to the firm and helps a firm distinguish hard-working associates from
profitable ones. Interview with Ezra Tom Clark, Jr., President E. T. Clark, Inc. (a
management consulting firm to the legal profession), in Salt Lake City, Utah (Nov.
2, 1992).
In these firms, one-third of an associate's revenues covers her salary; one106.
third covers her overhead; and one-third goes to the firm as "profits." Interview
with Ezra Tom Clark, Jr., supra note 105.
107.
Interestingly, many law schools are offering courses to help students focus
on clients' needs and promote "rainmaking skills." Julie Savarino, Rainmaking
Joins the Curriculum, NAT'L L.J. July 20, 1992, at 29, col. 4.
lOR.
See Kathleen Donovan, Note, Women Associates' Advancement to Partner
Status in Private Law Firms, 4 GEo. J. LE<:AL ETHICS U5 (1990):
[A] reason often given for the discrepancy of the number of women associates and the number of women partners is lack of "rainmaking." Women
in general have problems generating new clients for their firms . . . .
Lack of access to an "old boy network" is an element of the inability
to make rain. Private, men-only clubs seem to perpetuate women lawyers'
difficulty in attracting clients by denying them exposure to the business
constituents male members are afforded.

Id. at 14R.
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by the firm's standards. 109 In effect, an associate must demonstrate the ability to perform at or near partnership level.

B.

Subjective Criteria

Subjective criteria are just as important as objective criteria. Ilo Subjective considerations include personal integrity,
loyalty to the firm, interpersonal skills, and the ability to work
well with others. They also include a person's interests, hobbies
and activities that are beneficial to the firm and community,
leadership qualities (as demonstrated in civic, church, political,
alumni, and bar activities), personal habits, personal appearance, temperament, and physical stamina. 111

1. Problems with evaluating subjective factors
Each of these valid considerations, if abused, is fodder for
Title VII litigation. Law firms must apply these subjective
criteria without regard to sex. 112 A firm may not assume that
some qualities or characteristics are desirable for one sex but
not the other. 113 For example, in Price Waterhouse, partners
unexcusably criticized Ms. Hopkins because she did not act,
talk, and walk like a woman and did not wear jewelry or cosmetics. 114 These comments demonstrate that improper stereotypes influenced the partners and that Price Waterhouse had
different promotion criteria and expectations for women, even

109.
For example, in Ezold v. Wolf. Block, Schorr & So/is-Cohen, 758 F. Supp.
303, 304-0fi (E.D. Pa. 1991), some partners attacked the plaintiffs candidacy because the female plaintiff was assigned relatively simple cases "that were small by
Wolf, Block standards" which did not require "more than fiOO hours" per year.
Most male associates "worked on major matters for which they logged at least 600
hours per year." Ezold reveals that law firms do consider the complexity of the
matters handled by an associate and that law firms may engage in discriminatory
behavior if gender influences work assignments. See infra text accompanying notes
11fi-21.
110.
Lynch, supra note 102, at 65.
111.
ld. at 66-67.
112.
"In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." County of Washington v. Gunther,
4fi2 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 4:;fi U.S. 702, 707 n.1;:! (1978)).
U::l.
"[S]tandards [should he] shaped only by neutral professional and technical
considerations and not by any stereotypical notions of female roles and images."
Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 120fi, 121fi-16 (8th C1r. 198fi).
114.
See supra text accompanying note 47.
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though men and women candidates for partnership had essentially the same employment duties and responsibilities.
Similarly, in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 115 a prestigious Philadelphia law firm denied a female
associate, Nancy Ezold, a partnership position despite an overall "good" performance rating. 116 In evaluating her candidacy,
the district court compared Ezold's evaluations with those of
several male associates who were admitted to the partnership.117 The writing and legal skills of one admitted male
candidate were described as "acceptable," "dense and mediocre"
and "bare bones adequacy." 118 While some male candidates
were criticized for lacking sufficient assertiveness, Ezold was
evaluated negatively for being "very demanding" and "too assertive."119 Not surprisingly, the trial court found that "gender was a determining factor in the failure of the firm to promote [Ezold] to partnership" 120 because Schorr, Block appeared to have weighed "assertiveness," a valid subjective criterion, differently for men and women. 121

2. Impermissible Sex-based Assumptions
Law firms must carefully avoid hiring or promotion decisions based on stereotypes and sex-based assumptions. In a
telling passage from Price Waterhouse, which remains unaffected by Section 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act/ 22 Justice
Brennan wrote "[W]hile an employer may not take gender into
account in making an employment decision (except in those
very narrow circumstances in which gender is a BFOQ [bona
fide occupational qualification]), it is free to decide against a
woman for other reasons." 123
In other words, labelling a type of employment "a man's
job" or a "woman's job" is illegal except in very narrow circum-

11fi.
751 F. Supp. 117fi (E.D. Pa. 1990).
116.
!d. at 11H3.
117.
!d. at 11R4.
118.
!d. at 1184, 1192.
119.
!d. at 1189, 1192.
!d. at 1189.
120.
121.
"The defendant [law firm] is not entitled to apply its standards in a more
'severe' fashion to female associates." !d. at 1192.
122.
Section 107 abolished the "same decision" defense promulgated by the Price
Waterhouse plurality. See supra text accompanying note 2. Section 107 does not
appear to affect the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's sex discrimination guidelines.
123.
490 U.S. at 244.
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stances where that consideration is a "bona fide occupational
qualification." 124 Status as an actress or an actor is an example of a "BFOQ." 125
Even though it is inconceivable today that professional
employment could be considered a "man's job," the EEOC's
promulgations of what does not constitute a BFOQ illustrates
sex-based assumptions law firms must avoid. For example, the
assumption that women have a higher turnover rate than men
is impermissible. 126 In addition, hiring or promotion decisions
must not be influenced by the assumption that women are less
capable or aggressive in promoting or marketing. 127 Professional firms may not consider a client's preferences, 128 a
woman's marital status, 129 or the possibility of pregnancy. 130

3. Impact on large and small firms
To avoid possible Title VII litigation, law firms may deemphasize subjective factors in determining partnership selection decisions. Rewarding associates who have demonstrated
their economic worth to the firm eliminates many concerns
about stereotyping and impermissible discrimination. In fact,
many larger firms appear to be doing this for good reasons. 131
First, in large firms with hundreds of lawyers scattered all
across the world, a law firm's argument that a particular candidate does not fit the firm's "image" or "style" 132 seems

124.
See 29 C.F .R. § 1604.2(a)-(b) (1990).
12fi.
!d.
126.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(i) (1990).
127.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(ii) (1990).
128.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(iii) (1990).
129.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(c) (1990).
130.
Id.; see also Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990). In
Barbano one member of a five-person Madison County Veteran's Affairs Committee
asked a prospective female employee about "her plans on having a family and
whether her husband would object to her transporting male veterans" as part of
her employment duties. The Second Circuit concluded that all members present at
the meeting, not just the committee member who asked the discriminatory
questions, had discriminated against the plaintiff. !d. at 146.
131.
Brill, supra note fi, at fi.
132.
In Ezold, Ms. Ezold was told during interviews that "it would not be easy
for her [at the firm] because she was a woman, was not from an Ivy League Law
School, (Ms. Ezold [wa]s a graduate of Villanova Law School) and was not on Law
Review." 7fi1 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990). See also Lawrence Lederman, Entering
a World of Rules, NAT'L. L.J., August 1989, (Special Student Edition) at 16-17, 21,
where the author describes the difficulty of feeling comfortable in a prestigious
New York City law firm in the 1960s because he had a lower middle class background, he did not attend an Ivy League school, and he did not have correct social
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disingenuous. 133 Second, courts which have found partnerships liable for discrimination have examined the size of the
firm and the prestige associated with partnership status. In
Price Waterhouse, after remand from the Supreme Court, the
trial court noted that Price Waterhouse had nine-hundred partners in ninety offices across the United States and that "only a
small percentage of the partners [hadl ever met [the plaintiff]."134 The court also commented that "Price Waterhouse
lacks the intimacy and interdependence of smaller partnerships, so concerns about freedom of association have little
force." 13"
However, in smaller and mid-sized firms where attorneys
are expected to know each other and are likely to work together at least occasionally, legitimate subjective considerations
mean more and should be given serious consideration. However, smaller law firms should not be lulled into thinking Title
VII's reach does not apply to them. Hishon makes clear that
Title VII applies to all law firms "large enough to be covered by
Title VII." 136 Interestingly, smaller and mid-sized law firms,
which need to evaluate partnership candidates more subjectively than their larger counterparts, are the firms least likely to
take time to educate their personnel and create procedures and
structures to avert Title VII trouble.
VI.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO LIMIT

TITLE VII LIABILITY
Because the traditional criteria that professional firms use
to select partners are more likely to result in Title VII litigation, prudent law firms should consider the following policies
and procedures.

A

Education

One of the law's oldest maxims is "ignorance of the law is
no excuse." Partners who evaluate candidates should know
what Title VII says and understand Section 107's ramifications
on partnership selection decisions. Partners must know that

aspirations.
133.
Lynch, supra note 102, at 67.
134.
737 F. Supp. at 1210.

135.

!d.

136.
Hishon, 476 U.S. at 77-78, n.10. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83,
discussing Title VII's non-application to firms with fewer than fifteen employees.
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stereotyped evaluations, sex-based assumptions and characterizations are inappropriate and illegal.
Firms could convey this information and safeguard their
procedures in several ways. First, circulate in-house memoranda detailing the status of the law and its application to partnership selection decisions. Second, discuss firm evaluation
procedures and practices at firm meetings, retreats, or conferences. Third, attach instructions about the impropriety of stereotyped and gender specific comments on all of the firm's
evaluation forms, including partnership evaluation forms and
periodic associate evaluations. Fourth, choose one or several
attorneys to review all written evaluations, eliminating forms
or comments that contain discriminatory evaluations.

B. Implement regular associate evaluations
Perhaps the best way to prevent Title VII lawsuits is to
implement an evaluation system that provides associates with
regular reviews and feedback. Such evaluations should be held
at least once a year, and preferably more often. 137 A formal,
written evaluation system allows the partnership to measure
an employee's progress during regular interviews and eliminates ad-hoc, retrospective and vague evaluations. Periodic
evaluations of associates should include comments regarding an
associate's progress in meeting the firm's objective requirements and subjective standards.
Associates will also benefit from regular evaluations. Associates will know how the partnership feels about their performance and if their chances for partnership are realistic. Associates will be able to discuss and challenge their evaluations
when they are given, rather than when their candidacies for
partnership are rejected. Considering a plaintiffs relatively
light burden under Title VII, 138 partnerships that keep regular, detailed, and discrimination-free evaluations will do much
to prevent injurious litigation. Not coincidentally, the procedural history of Hishon reveals that no written evaluations were
communicated to the aggrieved associate.

137.

Paul Zamfsky, How the Hishon Decision Will Affect Your Firm, 70 A.B.A. J.

fiR, 61 (19R4).

13R.

See supra notes 9R-99.
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"Objectify" subjective factors

To the extent possible, a law finn should "objectify" each
valid subjective consideration. For example, a law finn might
describe in written fonn the image that the firm wishes to
project, and define how an associate is expected to behave with
other attorneys, office personnel and clients. Detailed guidelines will help associates know what is expected and what the
firm deems important. 139
However, law finns must realize that more is at stake than
avoiding Title VII liability. In their quest to "objectify" subjective criteria, law finns should not stifle creativity and alienate
talented associates with somewhat different backgrounds, lifestyles and interests. In fact, as the nation's economy becomes
more "global" (i.e., "multi-cultural"), finns should encourage
internal diversity if for no other reason than it makes good
business sense. It is no secret that individuals with similar
religious, ethnic, racial, and cultural backgrounds tend to do
business with each other. Rather than discourage minority or
female associates from breaking the finn mold, firms should
promote diversity and encourage efforts to reach out to all
sectors of the community. In short, law finns must balance
their needs for internal homogeneity against the reality of business development in an increasingly heterogenous world.

D.

Input by female and minority partners

If a finn is large enough to delegate its partnership selection decision to a committee, female and minority partners
should be included. 140 Their inclusion will eliminate "subconscious bias" and demonstrate the finn's commitment to promoting qualified persons to partnership regardless of race or gender. Disappointed applicants will be less inclined to feel victimized by discrimination if they believe that a similarly situated
person-with real input in the decision making process141-evaluated their candidacies. Finns may also consider

1:39.
Attorneys may bristle at these suggestions, arguing that such "guidelines"
undermine the professional elan of law firms. However, many law firms today
resemble multinational corporations and large business with branch offices scattered across the country. If large law firms expect to limit their own liability, they
must manage themselves internally like other large businesses.
140.
Zarefsky, supra note 1:37, at 61.
If minority and female committee members have no real power, matters
141.
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establishing internal equal employment and opportunity committees to ensure that the firm's hiring goals and promotion
practices comply with Title VII. 142

E.

Tone-down recruiting promises:

In Hishon, the Supreme Court held that Title VII applies
to law firms and ruled that if the evidence at trial established
that the parties contracted to have the plaintiff considered for
partnership, that promise was a term, condition, or privilege of
employment. 143 The Court's ruling was unquestionably influenced by Ms. Hishon's apparent reliance on the defendant
firm's representations that advancement to partnership was "a
matter of course" for associates who received satisfactory
evaluations. 144
As Hishon illustrates, the initial offer of employment,
whether oral or written, may come back to haunt the firm.
Consequently, law firms should re-evaluate what promises or
inducements its recruiters make to would-be associates. Law
firms probably do not need to tell prospective associates what
most of them already know (i.e., partnership is not automatic),
but law firms should not hint or suggest that partnership is a
sure thing or respond less than candidly to such inquiries. This
advice is especially relevant when firms extend offers of employment to lateral associates or third year law students who
have not worked for, or been exposed to, the firm. These associates are less likely to know the firm's expectations and requirements for partnership and the likelihood that they will become
partners in the future. In addition, law firms that are in the
practice of retaining permanent associates should inform unaware candidates of this possibility and not overstate a typical
associate's chances for partnership.

F. Consider alternatives to ((up or out" promotion schemes
Law firms that do not conduct regular personal evaluations
and have "up or out" promotion policies are vulnerable candidates for Title VII litigation. From an associate's perspective
will be made worse. Institutionalized window dressing and tokenism may result in
situations where, paraphrasing the words of Federalist 10, the "cure is worse than
the disease."
142.
Zarefsky, supra note la7, at 61.
143.
467 U.S. at 76.
144.
Id.
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this situation presents the worst of both worlds: terminated
employment and no formal, advance notification. Under such
conditions, fired associates can hardly be expected to react with
grace and docility.
Increasingly, law firms are allowing associates who do not
make partner to stay on with the firm as "permanent associates."145 With the consequences of non-partnership less drastic, potentially aggrieved associates are presumably less likely
to sue their current employer. More importantly from the law
firm's perspective, this makes economic sense: an associate's
raison d'etre is to make money for the firm. Since the firm has
probably invested considerable time and money training the
associate, bringing on a replacement associate with the attendant training costs does not always make economic sense.
In short, law firms which retain the "up or out" policy
should commit themselves to regular and informative periodic
evaluations of associates. Law firms should also consider implementing a "permanent associate" policy to alleviate the effects
of non-partnership.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Title VII claims against law firms for discrimination in the
partner selection process will probably increase because of legal
changes wrought by the 1991 Civil Rights Act and changing legal demographics. The 1991 Civil Rights Act abrogates an
employer's "same decision" defense and imposes Title VII liability if the impermissible consideration was a "motivating factor"
in the employer's decision to reject an employee's candidacy.
These changes correspond with a marked increase in minorities
and females entering the legal profession. Consequently, law
firms must understand Title VII as amended and implement
preventative policies and procedures. Specifically, firms should
educate their partners about Title VII's requirements, evaluate
associates regularly using written evaluations, inform associates about the firm's objective and subjective partnership criteria, seek input from minority and female firm members, tonedown recruiting promises, and consider alternatives to "up or

14fi.

Zarefsky, supra note 1::17 at fi8. See generally, Grahm, supra note 102.
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out" promotion schemes. Last, and perhaps most important,
law firms must realize that a heterogenous law firm reflecting
an increasingly diverse society may be in the firm's long-term
economic self-interest.

Ezra T. Clark III

